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SHELBY COUNTY AND THE ILLUSION OF MINIMALISM
Richard L. Hasen*
INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Shelby County v. Holder,1 holding
unconstitutional a key part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),2 purports to be
a modest decision written with reluctance and humility. The Court struck the cov-
erage formula in Section 4 of the VRA,3 which was used to determine which states
and local governments must submit any proposed voting changes for federal ap-
proval (or “preclearance”) under Section 5.4 According to the majority, by failing
to amend the VRA to update the coverage formula after the Court raised constitu-
tional doubts about preclearance in the 2009 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO),5 Congress “leaves us today with no
choice.”6 “Striking an Act of Congress ‘is the gravest and most delicate duty that
this Court is called on to perform.’”7 The majority held that the coverage formula
renewed without change by Congress in 2006 failed to take into account “current
conditions” of discrimination in covered jurisdictions and failed to treat states with
the “equal sovereignty” they deserved under the Tenth Amendment.8 Rather than
strike down Section 5 of the VRA, as Justice Thomas would have done,9 the Court
“issue[d] no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft
another formula based on current conditions.”10 The short opinion for the five most
conservative Justices on the Court—only two-thirds the size of Justice Ginsburg’s
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. A version
of this paper was prepared for delivery at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association in Chicago. Thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, Ellen Katz, Sandy Levinson,
Adam Liptak, Rick Pildes, and Michael Waterstone for useful comments and suggestions. All
errors are mine alone.
1 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973p (2006).
3 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619–31.
4 Id. at 2620.
5 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2519
(2009).
6 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
7 Id. (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)).
8 Id. at 2618, 2621.
9 Id. at 2631–32 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2517
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
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dissent for the four most liberal Justices11—casts itself as adhering to precedent,
reaching a result compelled by stare decisis and inevitably flowing from NAMUDNO.12
The majority ostensibly stands ready for Congress’s next step.
Despite the projected judicial modesty, the Shelby County Court was doing
much more than calling balls and strikes13 and applying settled precedent to uncon-
tested facts. Shelby County is an audacious opinion which ignores history, declines
to engage the dissent’s powerful argument that the VRA’s bailout provisions solve
any constitutional problem, and rejects the Roberts Court’s stated commitment to
judicial minimalism in its treatment of facial challenges and severability. It pretends
it is not overturning Section 5 of the VRA, yet it sets a standard under which any
new coverage formula will likely fail a constitutional test. The opinion disregards
the pervasive polarization in the current Congress, which dooms agreement on a
new coverage formula, and it seems to reject any replacement coverage formula.
But the opinion is minimalist in a different, important sense as well: its brevity
seeks to mask major doctrinal and jurisprudential change. By writing a very short
opinion and avoiding a discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment’s history and how
the Court silently resolved a dispute over the applicable standard of review, the Court
tried to hide the major jurisprudential hurdles it jumped to reach a political decision.
The opinion, relying on a new and unjustified “equal sovereignty” principle,14 demeans
the strength of Congress’s power to eradicate racial discrimination in voting, side-
stepping a key standard of review question raised, but not resolved, in NAMUDNO
regarding how much deference the Court owes Congress acting under its Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement powers.15 The opinion’s brevity is an insult, not an act of
modesty. As Justice Ginsburg remarked in dissent, “[h]ubris is a fit word for today’s
demolition of the VRA.”16
Yet the dissenters offer their own incomplete history of the VRA’s renewal,
failing to grapple with the more complex record of the congressional reenactment. To
11 See generally id.
12 See id. at 2619–30.
13 The reference here is to statements made by Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation
hearing that he would act as an umpire calling balls and strikes and decide no more than neces-
sary. Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Roberts Pledges He’ll Hear Cases with “Open Mind”:
Ritual Start of Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A1 (including a statement of Roberts
at his confirmation hearing: “And I will decide every case based on the record, according to
the rule of law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability. And I will remember that it’s my
job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat”). This is consistent with the ideas of judicial
minimalism. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3–5 (2001); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Fill-in-the-Blank Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at A27 (calling Roberts’s “balls and strikes” metaphor “appealing
but wholly disingenuous descriptions of what judges—liberal or conservative—actually do”).
14 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
15 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009).
16 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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hear the dissenters’ story, Congress in 2006 was nearly universally behind the
twenty-five-year renewal of Section 5 using the old coverage formula and would
have had no idea that the continuing use of the same coverage formula could have
doomed its constitutionality.17 In fact, it was a less happy story. Congress willfully
ignored the problems with the coverage formula which legal scholars brought to
Congress’s attention and which were amply covered by a Senate report written by
Republican committee staffers who were deeply skeptical of the Act’s continuing
constitutionality.18 While the Shelby County majority minimized the audaciousness
of its own holding, the dissenters minimized the difficult constitutional questions
before Congress and before the Court.
Part I briefly describes the background of the Shelby County case and in particu-
lar the questions left open in NAMUDNO. Part II analyzes the majority opinion and
explains the opinion as an act of false minimalism. Part III analyzes the dissenting
opinion and explains the dissent as one willfully silent about difficult constitutional
questions. In the end, the dissenters had the better argument about the Act’s consti-
tutionality, but the dissent would have been stronger had it described and grappled
more forthrightly with the struggles over the VRA’s renewal and the dangers of po-
litical avoidance. Shelby County is important not just for the loss of preclearance,
but also for the diminution of congressional power over voting rights in the future.
I. THE ROAD TO SHELBY COUNTY19
In 1965, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act (VRA).20 Section 5 of the
VRA required that “covered jurisdictions” obtain preclearance from the federal
government before making any changes in voting “practice[s] . . . or procedure[s],”21
from redistricting to voter identification rules to relocating a polling place. Congress
designated covered jurisdictions through a formula looking at whether the jurisdic-
tion employed a test or device for voting in 1964 and had voter turnout below fifty
percent.22 For each change, Section 5 of the VRA required the covered jurisdiction
to demonstrate that the change was made without a discriminatory purpose and that
it would not make the affected minority groups worse off.23 Section 5’s aim was to
prevent state and local governments with a history of discrimination against racial
17 Id. at 2632.
18 S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 25–30 (2006).
19 The next few pages of this Part draw heavily on Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional
Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181 [hereinafter
Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance].
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973p (2006).
21 Id. §§ 1973–1973b.
22 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619–21 (majority opinion), for a description of the
coverage formula over time.
23 Id. at 2626–27.
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minorities from changing their voting rules without first proving that such changes
would have neither a discriminatory purpose nor effect.24 Since 1965, Section 5 has
been very successful at assuring minority voting rights.25
Some covered jurisdictions challenged parts of the VRA as exceeding congres-
sional power. In the 1966 South Carolina v. Katzenbach case,26 the Court rejected
South Carolina’s argument that the Section 5 preclearance provision and other chal-
lenged parts of the VRA “exceed[ed] the powers of Congress and encroach[ed] on
an area reserved to the States by the Constitution.”27 On an eight-to-one vote—with
Justice Black dissenting28—the Court held that Congress had acted appropriately
under its powers granted in Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.29 In so holding, the
Court gave considerable deference to congressional determinations about the means
necessary to “enforce” the Fifteenth Amendment prohibition by states in discrimi-
nating in voting on the basis of race and applied a rationality standard of review.30
Over the years, Congress continued to renew Section 5, adding in additional cov-
erage areas pegged to a formula that was tied to data from 1964, 1968, and 1972.31
In 1982, Congress renewed the provision for a twenty-five-year period, expiring in
2007.32 The city of Rome, Georgia challenged the renewed preclearance provision,
and the Court again rejected the challenge.33 Then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justice Stewart, dissented, raising federalism concerns, as did Justice Powell.34
In the years since City of Rome, the Supreme Court underwent a federalism
revolution, narrowing congressional power over the states. Beginning with City of
Boerne v. Flores,35 the Court has limited Congress to passing “remedial” statutes.36
It has rejected congressional attempts to expand the scope of constitutional rights
through legislation beyond that which is “congruen[t] and proportional[]”37 to remedy
intentional unconstitutional discrimination by the states. In Board of Trustees v.
24 Id. at 2624 (“Case-by-case litigation had proved inadequate to prevent such racial
discrimination in voting, in part because States ‘merely switched to discriminatory devices
not covered by the federal decrees,’ ‘enacted difficult new tests,’ or simply ‘defied and evaded
court orders.’” (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966))).
25 Id. at 2626.
26 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307.
27 Id. at 323.
28 Id. at 355–61.
29 Id. at 337.
30 Id. at 324–27.
31 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013).
32 Id.
33 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980).
34 Id. at 206–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 193–206 (Powell, J., dissenting).
35 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
36 Id. at 519.
37 Id. at 520.
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Garrett,38 the Court indicated that it will search for an adequate evidentiary record
to support a congressional determination that states are engaging in sufficient, inten-
tionally unconstitutional conduct so as to justify congressional regulation.39 Impor-
tantly, the Boerne line of cases cited Katzenbach as correct, noting that Congress
was within its power to require preclearance, especially given the law’s limited tem-
poral and geographic scope.40
Because of the new federalism cases, election law scholars worried that unless
Congress made changes to the existing VRA Section 5 regime when the Act was due
to expire in 2007,41 a renewed Section 5 could be struck down as unconstitutional
under these new standards.42
Congress did make some changes to Section 5 when it renewed the Act in 2006,43
such as rejecting earlier, stingier Supreme Court interpretations of the applicable
Section 5 standards in Georgia v. Ashcroft44 and Reno v. Bossier Parish II.45 As we
will see below, these changes, which had the effect of making it more difficult for
covered jurisdictions to obtain preclearance, later appeared to agitate the Shelby
County majority on the Supreme Court.46
38 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
39 Id. at 373–74.
40 See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (2006); THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, at xi
(David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2008); Mike Allen, A Push to Extend Voting Rights Act; Rep.
Sensenbrenner Tells NAACP He Will Work to Renew Provisions of Law, WASH. POST, July 10,
2005, at A5.
42 See The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10–12 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes). See generally
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 41; Richard L. Hasen, Congressional
Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v.
Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (2005) [hereinafter Hasen, Congressional Power]; Samuel
Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1710 (2004). 
43 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 229 (D.D.C.
2008) (three-judge panel).
44 539 U.S. 461 (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006). For an exhaustive look at
how the renewed Section 5 deals with the Georgia v. Ashcroft precedent, see generally Nathaniel
Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174 (2007).
45 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
46 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626–27 (2013) (“In 2006, Congress amended
§ 5 to prohibit laws that could have favored such groups but did not do so because of a
discriminatory purpose . . . even though we had stated that such broadening of § 5 coverage
would ‘exacerbate the substantial federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already
exacts, perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about § 5’s constitutionality,’ . . . In addition,
Congress expanded § 5 to prohibit any voting law ‘that has the purpose of or will have the
effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States,’ on account of race,
color, or language minority status, ‘to elect their preferred candidates of choice.’ . . . In light of
those two amendments, the bar that covered jurisdictions must clear has been raised even as
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Congress, however, did not make changes to two key provisions of the VRA
which would have updated it to account for changed political realities. First, Congress
did not change the coverage formula determining which jurisdictions must engage
in preclearance. That formula used data from the 1964, 1968, or 1972 elections.47
Second, Congress did not seriously consider ways to make it easier for jurisdictions
that have been covered to “bail out” from coverage under the Act, such as by putting
the onus on the federal government to prepare a list of jurisdictions presumptively
entitled to bailout because of their good record on voting and race.48 These were
politically sensitive subjects, and it appears that Congress did not have enough in-
centive to address these difficult race and politics questions49 before re-authorizing
Section 5 for another twenty-five years by a wide margin.50 Although the reauthori-
zation passed by a lopsided margin, Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee
issued a report casting serious doubt on the renewal’s constitutionality.51 Even so,
all the Republican Senators on the Committee voted in favor of renewal.52
Soon after Congress passed the renewed Section 5, the Project on Fair Represen-
tation, a group ideologically opposed to Section 5 as impermissible race-based leg-
islation,53 backed litigation to challenge Section 5 as exceeding congressional power
under the Fifteenth Amendment.54 An obscure Austin utility district, the Northwest
the conditions justifying that requirement have dramatically improved.” (citations omitted));
see also id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“While the pre-2006 version of the Act went
well beyond protection guaranteed under the Constitution, see [Bossier II], . . . it now goes
even further.” (citations omitted)).
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
48 See Richard Hasen, Pass the VRA Bailout Amendment, ROLL CALL (July 11, 2006,
12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/52_3/-14173-1.html [hereinafter Hasen, Pass the
VRA Bailout Amendment].
49 See generally Persily, supra note 44, at 208; Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance,
Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 148 (2007), http://yalelaw
journal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/election-law/political-avoidance,-constitutional
-theory,-and-the-vra/.
50 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 229 (D.D.C.
2008) (three-judge panel) (“[I]n July 2006 Congress extended section 5 for an additional twenty-
five years. Entitled the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, the statute, which passed overwhelmingly
in both chambers (unanimously in the Senate and by 390–33 in the House), overruled several
Supreme Court decisions interpreting section 5’s substantive test, but otherwise left the law
virtually unchanged. . . . President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on July 27, 2006.”
(citation omitted)).
51 See generally S. REP. NO. 109-295 (2006); Persily, supra note 44, at 180–97.
52 See S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 4 (2006).
53 PROJECT ON FAIR REPRESENTATION, http://www.projectonfairrepresentation.org (last
visited Mar. 2, 2014).
54 See Chuck Lindell, Star Lawyer Makes Supreme Court Splash, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN (July 5, 2009), http://yetterwarden.com/news/statesman.pdf.
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Austin Municipal Utility District Number One,55 brought the Project’s challenge,
which was initially heard by a three-judge federal district court in Washington, D.C.56
Though its main argument was against the continued constitutionality of the pre-
clearance provision of Section 5, the utility district also argued it should be entitled
to bailout from coverage under the Act as a “political subdivision” covered by
Section 5.57
The three-judge court in an exhaustive and unanimous opinion rejected both
arguments.58 The court spent five pages addressing the bailout question59 and then
forty-eight pages addressing the thorny constitutional question.60 In light of the
statutory tour de force of the district court, voting rights experts believed that the
statutory bailout argument had no chance when NAMUDNO was appealed to the
Supreme Court.61 Instead, it seemed unavoidable that the Court would address the
constitutionality of the renewed Section 5.
In a surprising and relatively short opinion, however, the Court on an eight-to-
one vote decided NAMUDNO on statutory grounds,62 ruling that the utility district
was entitled to bailout.63 The Court applied the “avoidance canon,” which counsels
the Court to avoid declaring unconstitutional a federal statute about which there are
serious constitutional doubts when there is a narrowing statutory interpretation to
save the statute.64 Justice Thomas, speaking only for himself, would have held
Section 5 unconstitutional.65 In an earlier Supreme Court Review article, I demon-
strated at length how the Court’s statutory decision on bailout was disingenuous and
not supported by sound principles of statutory interpretation.66 Perhaps what is most
remarkable about the Court’s statutory interpretation in NAMUDNO is the conspiracy
of silence on the Court. No Justice, not even Justice Thomas in his partial dissent,
objected to the statutory analysis, which mangled Congress’s statutory intent.67
55 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 229–30
(D.D.C. 2008).
56 Id. at 221.
57 Id. at 223–31.
58 Id. at 230–82.
59 Id. at 230–35.
60 Id. at 235–82.
61 See, e.g., Heather Gerken, The Supreme Court Punts on Section 5, BALKINIZATION
(June 22, 2009, 10:42 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/supreme-court-punts-on-section
-5.html; Richard L. Hasen, Sordid Business: Will the Supreme Court Kill the Voting Rights
Act?, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2009, 11:59 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/ [hereinafter Hasen,
Sordid Business].
62 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2507–08 (2009).
63 Id. at 2508.
64 Id. at 2513; Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 19, at 182–89.
65 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2517 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66 See generally Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 19.
67 Id. at 182.
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In the earlier article, I offered three possible reasons why the Court engaged in
the tortured statutory analysis and avoided the constitutional issue: perhaps the Court
wanted to foster dialogue with Congress, spurring it to revise the VRA; perhaps the
Court wished to preserve its public legitimacy by not striking a crown jewel of the
civil rights movement unless absolutely necessary; or perhaps the Court was acting
strategically, writing a statutory opinion casting constitutional doubts to soften the
blow for an eventual overturning of the VRA.68 In hindsight, the third explanation
seems the most plausible explanation for the majority’s motivations, although all
three still remain plausible.69
Although the Court did not resolve the constitutional question, it offered several
pages of dicta on the question of Section 5’s constitutionality.70 The Court began by
noting the great strides in minority voter registration and otherwise for minorities
in covered jurisdictions since the 1965 VRA enactment.71 It then noted the “substan-
tial federalism costs,”72 and how those costs had caused members of the Court in the
past “to express serious misgivings about the constitutionality of § 5.”73
The Court commented that some of the improvements in conditions for minority
voters “are no doubt due in significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself . . . . Past
success alone, however, is not adequate justification to retain the preclearance re-
quirements.”74 “[T]he Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current
needs.”75 Further, the VRA “differentiates between the States, despite our historic
tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”76
The Court then noted that the coverage formula may be outdated: “The statute’s
coverage formula is based on data that is now more than thirty-five years old, and
there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions.”77
It also highlighted the fact that “Congress heard warnings from supporters of extend-
ing § 5 that the evidence in the record did not address systematic differences between
68 Id. at 183–84.
69 It is a different question why the liberal dissenters in Shelby County signed on to the
NAMUDNO opinion’s discussion of the serious constitutional doubts about the preclearance
provision of the VRA. The dissenters could well have been trying to forestall a ruling or to
signal to Congress that Section 5 was in danger. See Richard L. Hasen, Are the Liberal
Justices Savvy or Suckers?, SLATE (July 1, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles
/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/07/are_the_liberals_on_the_supreme_court_savvy
_or_suckers.html [hereinafter Hasen, Are the Liberal Justices Savvy or Suckers?].
70 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511–13 (majority opinion).
71 Id. at 2511.
72 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2506.
76 Id. at 2512 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)).
77 Id.
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the covered and non-covered areas of the United States . . . and, in fact, the evidence
that is in the record suggests there is more similarity than difference.”78
The Court then turned to the key question of the standard of review, and on this
issue the Justices punted:
The parties do not agree on the standard to apply in deciding
whether, in light of the foregoing concerns, Congress exceeded
its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power in extending the
preclearance requirements. The district argues that “[t]here must
be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end,” . . .
the Federal Government asserts that it is enough that the legis-
lation be a “rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohi-
bition,” . . . . That question has been extensively briefed in this
case, but we need not resolve it. The Act’s preclearance require-
ments and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional ques-
tions under either test.79
The Court concluded—in a paragraph which in retrospect appears to have been
insisted upon by the Court’s liberal Justices—by stressing its limited “institutional
role,”80 noting the gravity of reviewing an Act of Congress, affirming that Congress
is a co-equal branch of government, and stating that “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment
empowers ‘Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first instance what legisla-
tion is needed to enforce it. Congress amassed a sizable record in support of its
decision to extend the preclearance requirements, a record the District Court deter-
mined ‘document[ed] contemporary racial discrimination in covered states.’”81
Congress did nothing to reconsider the coverage formula or otherwise change
the VRA for four years after NAMUDNO. Meanwhile, the Project on Fair Represen-
tation,82 dissatisfied with the outcome of NAMUDNO despite a statutory win, looked
for a new plaintiff to challenge the Act,83 choosing Shelby County, Alabama, a juris-
diction not entitled to bailout because there had been recent objections to the county’s
proposed voting changes.84
78 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79 Id. at 2512–13 (citations omitted).
80 Id. at 2513.
81 Id. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221,
265 (D.D.C. 2008)).
82 PROJECT ON FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 53.
83 Joan Biskupic, Special Report: Behind U.S. Race Cases, a Little-Known Recruiter,
REUTERS (Dec. 4, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/04/us-usa-court
-casemaker-idUSBRE8B30V220121204.
84 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013) (“It has not sought bailout, as the
Attorney General has recently objected to voting changes proposed from within the county.”)
During the same term as the Court heard the Shelby County case, it also considered the fate
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In the Shelby County case, a federal district court, in a lengthy opinion, rejected
Shelby County’s facial constitutional attack on preclearance. Judge John D. Bates,
a George W. Bush appointee,85 examined the record before Congress in 2006 and
found sufficient evidence of continuing problems with race discrimination in voting
in the covered jurisdictions to justify congressional renewal of preclearance under the
Boerne congruence and proportionality test (or alternatively under the less onerous
Katzenbach rationality standard).86 A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit affirmed.87 Judge David S. Tatel, a Clinton appointee,88 wrote an
opinion joined by Judge Thomas Griffith, a George W. Bush appointee.89 In another
extensive analysis of the evidence before Congress, the appellate court found the
evidence of continued problems with race discrimination in voting in the covered
jurisdictions satisfied the Boerne standard (or alternatively under the less onerous
Katzenbach rationality standard).90 Judge Stephen F. Williams, a Reagan appointee,91
dissented. He concluded that the coverage formula in Section 4 of the VRA was irra-
tional and unconstitutional.92 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.93
II. THE SHELBY COUNTY MAJORITY’S FALSE MINIMALISM
A. The Majority Opinion
The structure of the Shelby County majority opinion mirrors the constitutional
portion of the NAMUDNO decision,94 in essence, treating NAMUDNO as though it
of affirmative action in higher education in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S.
Ct. 2411 (2013), another case from the Project on Fair Representation. See Project on Fair
Representation, Press Release, Supreme Court Strikes Down University of Texas Affirmative
Action Policy, Statement of Abigail Fisher (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.projecton
fairrepresentation.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/POFR-Fisher-Press-Release-SCOTUS
.pdf. Fisher looks a lot like NAMUDNO, in punting but signaling an eventual Supreme Court
striking down of a race-based law. Richard L. Hasen, The Chief Justice’s Long Game, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A25 [hereinafter Hasen, The Chief Justice’s Long Game].
85 District Judge John D. Bates, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/bates (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
86 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428–35 (D.D.C. 2011).
87 See generally Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
88 Judge David S. Tatel, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc.uscourts
.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+DST (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
89 Judge Thomas B. Griffith, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc
.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+TBG (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
90 Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 859–61.
91 Judge Stephen F. Williams, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc
.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+SFW (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
92 Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 885 (Williams, J., dissenting).
93 Id.
94 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508–10 (2009).
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offered binding holdings on the constitutional questions rather than merely raising
constitutional doubts about the statute for purposes of applying the avoidance canon.95
The major differences between the NAMUDNO dicta and the Shelby County holding
on the constitutionality of preclearance is that Shelby County ignores the Boerne/
Katzenbach standard of review question entirely (the majority fails even to cite
Boerne in its opinion96), and it shifts the constitutional question from one focused
on the constitutionality of Section 5 preclearance to one solely addressing the con-
stitutionality of the Section 4 coverage formula.97
Shelby County began by recounting the progress made in racial discrimination
in voting, while acknowledging “[a]t the same time, voting discrimination still exists;
no one doubts that.”98 The opinion offered a brief history of racial discrimination in
voting covering the Fifteenth Amendment, the enactment of the VRA in 1965, and
the congressional renewals of preclearance.99 After describing NAMUDNO and its
statements about the “substantial federalism costs” of Section 5,100 the majority
opinion noted that “[e]ight Members of the Court subscribed to these views, and the
remaining Member would have held the Act unconstitutional.”101 This statement led
Justice Ginsburg to retort in her dissent that “[a]cknowledging the existence of
‘serious constitutional questions’ . . . does not suggest how those questions should
be answered.”102
The Shelby County majority then described the current litigation, noting that the
majority in the D.C. Circuit relied upon a study by Professor Ellen Katz and her co-
authors showing a higher rate of VRA Section 2 litigation in covered jurisdictions
than in non-covered jurisdictions.103 The majority highlighted Judge Williams’s dis-
sent in the D.C. Circuit and his determination that Section 4’s coverage formula was
“irrational and unconstitutional.”104
95 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013).
96 Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future Jurisprudence
of Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 7:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2013/06/the-curious-disappearance-of-boerne-and-the-future-jurisprudence-of-voting
-rights-and-race/ [hereinafter Hasen, The Curious Disappearance].
97 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627.
98 Id. at 2619.
99 Id. at 2619–21.
100 Id. at 2621.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 2637 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
103 See generally Ellen Katz et. al, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2006).
104 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 (“Judge Williams dissented. He found ‘no positive corre-
lation between inclusion in § 4(b)’s coverage formula and low black registration or turnout.’
Rather, to the extent there was any correlation, it actually went the other way: ‘condemnation
under § 4(b) is a marker of higher black registration and turnout.’ . . . Judge Williams also
found that ‘[c]overed jurisdictions have far more black officeholders as a proportion of the
black population than do uncovered ones.’ As to the evidence of successful § 2 suits, Judge
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Turning to the merits, the majority wrote as though the Court already had de-
termined the standard of review in NAMUDNO. It sidestepped the Boerne issue with
its first footnote reading that “[b]oth the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were
at issue in Northwest Austin . . . and accordingly Northwest Austin guides our review
under both Amendments in this case.”105
Proceeding without clarifying the standard of review, the Court wrote that
“[o]utside the strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in
structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Con-
stitution provides that all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government
are reserved to the States or citizens.”106 The opinion declared the Framers’ intent
to have the states maintain power over elections through the Tenth Amendment,107
while noting that the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 gives Congress the power
to set the time and manner for congressional elections.108 The Court further held that
state sovereignty, protected through the Tenth Amendment against federal govern-
ment encroachment includes a “principle of equal sovereignty among the states.”109
The Shelby County majority then held that “[t]he Voting Rights Act sharply de-
parts from these [Tenth Amendment] principles” by making covered states “beseech
the Federal government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise
have the right to enact and execute on their own.”110 The law further violates “equal
sovereignty” principles because while covered states can “wait . . .  months or years
and expend[] funds to implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically
put the same law into effect immediately.”111 Covered states are also subject to dif-
ferent substantive standards under the Act, including a shifting of the burden of proof
to covered jurisdictions to prove an absence of discriminatory purpose and effect.112
The majority conceded that the coverage formula initially adopted “made sense”
to deal with areas where discrimination was most prevalent113 and that the VRA
itself “in large part” was responsible for improvements in voting conditions for
Williams disaggregated the reported cases by State, and concluded that ‘[t]he five worst un-
covered jurisdictions . . . have worse records than eight of the covered jurisdictions.’ He also
noted that two covered jurisdictions—Arizona and Alaska—had not had any successful re-
ported § 2 suit brought against them during the entire 24 years covered by the data. Judge
Williams would have held the coverage formula of § 4(b) ‘irrational’ and unconstitutional.”).
105 Id. at 2622 n.1 (citations omitted).
106 Id. at 2623.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. (quoting NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
110 Id. at 2616.
111 Id. at 2624.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 2625.
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minority voters.114 But it concluded that the decline in racial discrimination in voting
(as measured by objections in the covered jurisdictions) and the increase in minority
voting statistics and minority representation in Congress showed a coverage formula
now constitutionally impermissible.115 The formula was made even more problematic
when Congress made preclearance more difficult by reversing Georgia v. Ashcroft
and Bossier II.116
The Court rejected the argument that the improvements on the ground could be
attributable to Section 5’s deterrent effect,117 which justified continuation of the law:
“Under this theory . . . § 5 would be effectively immune from scrutiny; no matter
how ‘clean’ the record of covered jurisdictions, the argument could always be made
that it was deterrence that accounted for the good behavior.”118
Finally, the Court majority rejected counterarguments of the federal government
and dissent. It disagreed with the Government that the original coverage formula
was “reverse-engineer[ed]” back in the 1960s119 and that the Government need not
show a “logical relationship between the criteria in the formula and the reason for
coverage.”120 It held that Katzenbach121 in fact recognized a rational relationship
between the coverage formula and the aims of preclearance in 1965 and that the
failure to show “even relevance [between the coverage formula and current condi-
tions] is fatal.”122 The Court characterized the government as ignoring history after
1965;123 for preclearance to remain constitutional, Congress must use “current data
reflecting current needs.”124
The Court in a single paragraph then dismissed as irrelevant thousands of pages
of congressional evidence supporting the continuing need for preclearance and the
Katz study: “Contrary to the dissent’s contention, we are not ignoring the record; we
are simply recognizing that it played no role in shaping the statutory formula before
114 Id. at 2626.
115 Id. at 2622, 2625–26; see also id. at 2627–28 (“Coverage today is based on decades-
old data and eradicated practices . . . . Today the Nation is no longer divided along those
lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.”).
116 Id. at 2626–27 (describing how Congress’s 2006 Act negated discussions in Bossier II
and Georgia v. Ashcroft).
117 Id. at 2627.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 2628.
120 Id.
121 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
122 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628 (2013).
123 Id. (“[H]istory did not end in 1965.”).
124 Id. at 2629; see also id. (“To serve that purpose [of ensuring a better future], Congress—
if it is to divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that
makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past. We made that clear
in Northwest Austin, and we make it clear again today.”).
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us today.”125 “Regardless of how to look at the record, however, no one can fairly
say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and
‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished
the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.”126
The Court also dismissed in a short paragraph the dissent’s argument that Shelby
County cannot complain about the coverage formula because under any rational
coverage formula Shelby County and the state of Alabama, with their recent histories
of race discrimination in voting, deserved to be covered.127
The Court concluded by protesting that the dissent “analyzes the question
presented as if our decision in Northwest Austin never happened,”128 noting that
“four years ago, in an opinion joined by two of today’s dissenters, the Court ex-
pressly stated that ‘[t]he Act’s preclearance requirement and its coverage formula
raise serious constitutional questions.”129 It then sought to minimize its holding:
Striking an Act of Congress “is the gravest and most delicate
duty that this Court is called on to perform.” [T]hat is why, in
2009, we took care to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act when asked to do so, and instead resolved the
case then before us on statutory grounds.130
It concluded that Congress “leaves us today with no choice.”131 Rather than strike
down Section 5, the Court “issue[s] no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage
formula. Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.”132
B. False Minimalism
Shelby County is falsely minimalist in two ways. First, the opinion purports to
decide less than it could have, pretending to leave room for Congress to respond to
the decision with a new preclearance regime. Second, the opinion is brief and
breezy, eliding rather than confronting serious jurisprudential hurdles in the way of
its decision.
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Shelby County tries mightily to
minimize the importance of its holding by acting as though it engaged in an act of
125 Id. (citation omitted).
126 Id. (citations omitted).
127 Id. at 2629–30 (“But that is like saying that a driver pulled over pursuant to a policy of
stopping all redheads cannot complain about that policy, if it turns out his license has expired.”).
128 Id. at 2630.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2631 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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judicial minimalism. The message the majority tries to send is the following: In
2006, Congress insulted us by renewing Section 5 for twenty-five more years and
making preclearance harder, despite our warnings that doing so would increase the
law’s constitutional problems, and despite hearing testimony from experts that failure
to modify the coverage formula could render the Act unconstitutional. We did not
initially strike down the VRA in the 2009 NAMUDNO case133 despite Congress’s
insult; we gave Congress more time and flagged the serious constitutional issue, but
Congress did nothing. Yet another insult. We had no choice but to act when the
issue came back before us in 2013.134 The result we reach in Shelby County is a
simple application of the rules established in NAMUDNO; we made no new law. But
we took as small a step as we could: rather than striking the preclearance regime of
Section 5 itself, as Justice Thomas would have done,135 we struck only the Section 4
the coverage formula, leaving Congress with room to update the VRA to account for
current conditions.136 We acted gravely and seriously, doing no more than necessary
and recognizing our limited institutional role.
In fact, the opinion is audacious, rather than modest; it creates new law without
adequate justification which limits congressional power to enforce voting rights; it
willfully ignores political realities; its brevity, rather than signaling humility and
minimalism, demonstrates a failure to engage with the voluminous congressional
record and substantial arguments of the law’s defenders and of the dissent; and the
Court issued a broad decision when minimalism counseled issuing a narrower one.
The remainder of this Part explains the false minimalism of the majority opinion.
To begin with, the Court’s decision to sidestep the standard of review reflects
something other than doctrinal sloppiness. Indeed, it is impossible to believe that the
majority’s failure to explicitly address whether Boerne “congruence and propor-
tionality”137 or Katzenbach rationality138 applies to review of this congressional
legislation was an oversight. The parties vigorously debated, and the Court flagged
but did not decide the issue in NAMUDNO,139 the district court judge and the
majority and dissenting opinions in the D.C. Circuit in the Shelby County case
addressed the standard of review issue,140 the parties briefed the issue in the Supreme
133 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009).
134 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612.
135 Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136 See Artemus Ward & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Judicial Minimalism Is Alive and Well on
the Roberts Court, NAT’L L.J. (July 3, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com
/id=1202609561827 (characterizing Shelby County as a case where the Justices could have,
but did not, “overturn the VRA”).
137 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
138 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
139 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2516 (2009).
140 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 859, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 594 (2012); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 447 (D.D.C. 2011).
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Court,141 and the dissent argued against Boerne and in favor of application of the
Katzenbach rationality standard.142 The dissent even flagged the majority’s failure
to state the standard of review.143
Rather than address the issue or reply to the dissent, the Court engaged in the
worst kind of bootstrapping by seeking to incorporate the (non-) standard of review
from NAMUDNO in footnote one.144 As I noted when the opinion first came out, the
footnote appears deliberately inscrutable: “[T]he Court sidesteps an issue about the
standard of review in Case 1, and in Case 2 the Court endorses Case 1’s analysis of
the standard of review.”145
The issue matters immensely to the core of the legal question in Shelby County
because it sets the basic ground rules for determining who decides which steps are
necessary to prevent racial discrimination in voting.146 The dissent powerfully argues
that the Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement standard gives Congress, not the Court,
the power to decide how to enforce the amendment’s ban on racial discrimination in
voting.147 The dissent offers a muscular and integrated vision of the five constitutional
141 All of the parties’ Supreme Court briefs discussed the potential applicability of Boerne.
See Brief for Petitioner, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96); Reply Brief for Petitioner
at 12–14, 18, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96); Brief for Federal Respondent at 18–19,
34, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96); Brief for Respondent-Intervenor Bobby Lee
Harris, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96); Brief for Respondent-Intervenors Bobby
Pierson et al., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96).
142 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2637–38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 2644 (“Without even identifying a standard of review, the Court dismissively
brushes off arguments based on ‘data from the record,’ and declines to enter the ‘debat[e
about] what [the] record shows.’”).
144 Id. at 2622 n.1 (majority opinion) (“Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
were at issue in Northwest Austin, and accordingly Northwest Austin guides our review under
both Amendments in this case.” (citation omitted)).
145 See Hasen, The Curious Disappearance, supra note 96.
146 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The question this case pre-
sents is who decides whether, as currently operative, § 5 remains justifiable.”); id. at 2637 (“So
when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote free from racial discrimination, we ask not
whether Congress has chosen the means most wise, but whether Congress has rationally se-
lected means appropriate to a legitimate end.”).
147 The dissenters write:
The stated purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to arm Con-
gress with the power and authority to protect all persons within the Nation
from violations of their rights by the States. In exercising that power,
then, Congress may use “all means which are appropriate, which are plain-
ly adapted” to the constitutional ends declared by these Amendments. . . .
So when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote free from racial dis-
crimination, we ask not whether Congress has chosen the means most
wise, but whether Congress has rationally selected means appropriate
to a legitimate end. “It is not for us to review the congressional reso-
lution of [the need for its chosen remedy]. It is enough that we be able
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amendments mentioning the right to vote and, coupled with its view of the Elections
Clause in Article 4, the Constitution gives Congress broad power to protect the fran-
chise and democratic processes against state encroachment.148
A lower rationality standard affords Congress much more leeway under the
VRA, leeway which supports the constitutionality of the preclearance standard and
justifies other parts of the VRA, such as Section 2,149 which protects minority voting
strength in districting plans and elsewhere, and Section 203,150 which protects lan-
guage minorities and requires that the translation of certain election-related materials.
to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict
as it did.” . . .
Until today, in considering the constitutionality of the VRA, the
Court has accorded Congress the full measure of respect its judgments
in this domain should garner. South Carolina v. Katzenbach supplies
the standard of review: “As against the reserved powers of the States,
Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.” . . . Faced with sub-
sequent reauthorizations of the VRA, the Court has reaffirmed this
standard. . . . Today’s Court does not purport to alter settled precedent
establishing that the dispositive question is whether Congress has
employed “rational means.”
Id. at 2637–38 (citations omitted).
148 Id. at 2636 n.2 (“The Constitution uses the words ‘right to vote’ in five separate places:
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. Each
of these Amendments contains the same broad empowerment of Congress to enact ‘appro-
priate legislation’ to enforce the protected right. The implication is unmistakable: Under our
constitutional structure, Congress holds the lead rein in making the right to vote equally real
for all U.S. citizens. These Amendments are in line with the special role assigned to Congress
in protecting the integrity of the democratic process in federal elections. U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 4 (‘[T]he Congress may at any time by Law make or alter’ regulations concerning the ‘Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.’); Arizona v. Inter
Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).”). This footnote may help explain why
the Shelby County dissenters were willing to sign on to Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. 2247, despite language in the opinion which could be used
later by states to fight federal election legislation by claiming such legislation impedes state
power to set voter qualifications. See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court Gives States New
Weapons in the Voting Wars, DAILY BEAST (June 17, 2013, 1:27 PM), http://www.thedailybeast
.com/articles/2013/06/17/the-supreme-court-gives-states-new-weapons-in-the-voting-wars
.html [hereinafter Hasen, The Supreme Court]. In a future case involving a state’s qualifications
power being raised against a federal election rule, the dissenters likely would seek to distance
themselves from the voter qualifications dicta in Inter Tribal Council just as they distanced them-
selves from the NAMUDNO dicta in Shelby County. Instead, the dissenters offer a nascent
theory of broad congressional power to assure equality in voting.
149 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, Pub. L. No. 89-110 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (2006)).
150 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 203, Pub. L. No. 89-110, amended by Pub. L. No. 94-73
(1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f) (2006)).
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In supporting the rationality of Congress’s readoption of the coverage formula,
the dissent pointed to numerous recent instances of racial discrimination in voting
rules occurring in covered jurisdictions. For example, 
In 2001, the mayor and all-white five-member Board of Aldermen
of Kilmichael, Mississippi, abruptly canceled the town’s election
after ‘an unprecedented number’ of African-American candidates
announced they were running for office. The Department of
Justice (DOJ) required an election, and the town elected its first
black mayor and three black aldermen.151
The dissent also noted that the Court itself in a 2006 case held that the State of
Texas engaged in intentional racial discrimination against Latino voters in its mid-
decade congressional redistricting.152
The dissent further argued that the Court should apply a more deferential
standard of review when it considers the constitutionality of a law being renewed
compared to when it considers the constitutionality of a new law.153 Assuming that
Section 5 worked successfully at least as a partial deterrent, no one would expect to
see continued “flagrant,” “wide-spread,” or “rampant” racial discrimination in
voting occurring in covered jurisdictions.154 Nonetheless, the Katz study demon-
strated that despite the preclearance requirement, covered jurisdictions as a whole had
more successful VRA Section 2 suits against them than non-covered jurisdictions.155
The dissent concluded that under the broad Katzenbach rationality standard of
review, the continued preclearance regime should pass constitutional muster.156
The majority’s failure to take on the standard of review issue is more nefarious
than simply ignoring the arguments of the dissent. Through the bootstrapping on the
issue in the first footnote of Shelby County,157 the majority could well write in future
cases that it had established the Boerne standard as applying to review of all voting
151 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006)).
153 Id. at 2636–38.
154 Id. at 2617 (majority opinion).
155 In response the majority cited Judge Williams’s D.C. Circuit dissent noting that disag-
gregating the Katz study’s numbers showed that some covered jurisdictions fared better than
some non-covered jurisdictions. Id. at 2622. The dissent replied that these differences might
be a reason to reject the constitutionality of preclearance as applied to the better-performing
covered jurisdictions, and to sever those jurisdictions leaving the rest of the preclearance
provision standing. Id. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a brief methodological critique
of the Katz study, see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination?, 108
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 32 (2008), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads
/2008/06/31_CoxMiles.pdf.
156 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2638–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 2622 n.1 (majority opinion) (“Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
were at issue in Northwest Austin, and accordingly Northwest Austin guides our review under
both Amendments in this case.” (citation omitted)).
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laws Congress passes under its Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
powers.158 Boerne itself never overruled Katzenbach—instead it endorsed it—yet
Shelby County may be read as treating Boerne as having overruled Katzenbach’s
rationality standard. Such disingenuousness would be no different than the disin-
genuousness the majority displayed in Shelby County when it repeatedly treated
NAMUDNO as if it decided, rather than simply raised under the avoidance canon,
constitutional questions with the preclearance regime. Future constitutional attacks
on federal anti-discrimination voting laws such as Sections 2 and 203 of the VRA159
will rely upon Shelby County and assert the cases require a tough standard of review.
Opponents will argue in response that Shelby County avoided deciding the issue
because the coverage formula would fail under either standard of review.
More time bombs lurk in Shelby County as well.160 Most importantly, as Professor
Sandy Levinson has noted, in discussing Congress’s powers against the states under
the Tenth Amendment, the Shelby County majority seems to have broadened the
Tenth Amendment significantly.161 The majority writes: “Outside the strictures of
the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their govern-
ments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Constitution provides that all
powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the States
or citizens.”162 By adding the word “specifically,” the majority seeks to limit con-
gressional power toward those narrowly enumerated in the Constitution.
As Levinson notes, the Framers rejected limiting Congress’s powers in the Tenth
Amendment to those powers “expressly” granted to Congress, but Chief Justice
Roberts appears to be trying to sneak the limiting standard back into the Constitution
through an act of interpretation.163 In any case, as both Levinson and the Shelby
158 The dissent signals that such an interpretation is coming. Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“If the Court is suggesting that dictum in Northwest Austin silently overruled
Katzenbach’s limitation of the equal sovereignty doctrine to ‘the admission of new States,’
the suggestion is untenable. Northwest Austin cited Katzenbach’s holding in the course of
declining to decide whether the VRA was constitutional or even what standard of review ap-
plied to the question. . . . In today’s decision, the Court ratchets up what was pure dictum in
Northwest Austin, attributing breadth to the equal sovereignty principle in flat contradiction
of Katzenbach. The Court does so with nary an explanation of why it finds Katzenbach wrong,
let alone any discussion of whether stare decisis nonetheless counsels adherence to Katzenbach’s
ruling on the limited ‘significance’ of the equal sovereignty principle.” (citations omitted)).
159 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b(f) (2006).
160 On time bombs generally, see Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations,
Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J.
779 (2012) [hereinafter Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings].
161 Sandy Levinson, Tendentious, Mendacious or Audacious? John Roberts Rewrites the
10th Amendment, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013
/06/tendentious-mendacious-or-audacious.html.
162 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (emphasis added).
163 Levinson, supra note 161 (“One might offer three different descriptions of this sentence:
a) merely tendentious; b) mendacious; or c) cleverly audacious, setting the basis for future
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County dissenters argue, the Constitution does specifically grant Congress under its
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers the power to pass legislation such as
Section 5 of the VRA.164
This point highlights the Shelby County majority’s ahistoricism. Chief Justice
Roberts excoriates the federal government for acting as though history ended in
1965.165 Yet conspicuously absent from the majority opinion is any real appreciation
of how the Civil War amendments, including the Fifteenth Amendment, changed the
state-federal balance of power and the scope of the Tenth Amendment.166 Congres-
sional power should be at its highest when it comes to passing laws aimed at pre-
venting race discrimination in voting, one of the key issues following the Civil War
and the readmission of the former confederate states back into the Union.167 Fairly
understanding Congress’s enforcement powers under the Fifteenth Amendment, and
specifically its power to pass laws preventing racial discrimination in voting, re-
quires a deep analysis of the Fifteenth Amendment’s history, a discussion conspicu-
ously absent from the majority’s breezy historical discussion.
Instead of this crucial history, the Court places almost all of its doctrinal weight
on the Tenth Amendment and the view that the Tenth Amendment protects not
just state sovereignty—absent specific federal power otherwise recognized in the
Constitution—but also a principle of “equal sovereignty,” requiring Congress to
treat all states the same absent some compelling reason.168 Even putting aside the
dissent’s examples of other congressional legislation in which states are not treated
the same,169 the argument simply highlights the ahistoricism of the Shelby County
majority. Not only does the Court fail to point to anything in the history of the Tenth
Amendment which requires that all states be treated equally, the Civil War amend-
ments belay a history requirement of equal treatment—former slave and confederate
states needed to do much more to assure equality on the basis of race in voting than
the other states.170
citations of the form ‘as we recognized in Shelby County, only powers ‘specifically granted
to the Federal Government’ are legitimate and all others are reserved to the states.’ As a long-
time law professor, I can only say that if a student, asked to complete a short-answer question
on ‘what does the 10th Amendment say,’ wrote what Roberts did, I would be disinclined to
award it a very good grade.”).
164 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636–37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See generally Levinson,
supra note 161.
165 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2727–29 (majority opinion).
166 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 84–93 (rev. ed. 2009).
167 Cf. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See generally KEYSSAR,
supra note 166.
168 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622–24 (majority opinion).
169 Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170 See generally Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175
(2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/06/08/fishkin.html.
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In short, as conservative legal scholar—and former Tenth Circuit judge—Michael
McConnell remarked following issuance of the Shelby County opinion, the equal
sovereignty principle enunciated by the Shelby County majority is “made up.”171
“There’s no requirement in the Constitution to treat all states the same. . . . It might
be an attractive principle, but it doesn’t seem to be in the Constitution.”172 Further,
even granted the ability of the Court to “make up” a new standard, doing so is unjus-
tified in the case of Congress’s power to prevent race discrimination in voting granted
by the Civil Rights amendments, which grew out of the end of a war in which some
states, but not all states, systematically violated the rights of some of its citizens.
It is the majority fixation on the new principle of “equal sovereignty,” as well
as the unfair treatment of NAMUDNO as binding precedent, which leads the conser-
vative Justices to justify ignoring the record.173 To the Shelby County majority, it is
not enough if there are problems with race discrimination in voting in the covered
jurisdictions; it must be shown that conditions are worse in the covered jurisdictions
than in the uncovered jurisdictions.
But the majority goes even further than requiring that there be real differences
in levels of race discrimination in voting between covered and uncovered jurisdic-
tions174—differences which the dissent says are demonstrated by the Katz study.175
Congress must designate the covered jurisdictions using a current formula pegged to
“current conditions,”176 regardless of whether the covered jurisdictions present a
greater Fifteenth Amendment danger of race discrimination in voting.177 As the
majority wrote: “[W]e are not ignoring the record; we are simply recognizing that
it played no role in shaping the statutory formula before us today.”178 Thus the
formula itself takes on constitutional significance for reasons the majority does not
articulate. Under this reasoning, Congress could not even pass a congruent and
proportional preclearance provision accurately targeting those areas in which race
discrimination is a problem unless Congress also could demonstrate it did so with
the “right” formula.179
171 Nina Totenberg, Whose Term Was It? A Look Back at the Supreme Court, NPR (July 5,
2013, 3:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/198708325/whose-term-was-it-a-look-back
-at-the-supreme-court (quoting Michael McConnell).
172 Id.
173 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618, 2621–24.
174 See id.
175 Id. at 2642–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 2631 (majority opinion).
177 Id. at 2629.
178 Id. But see id. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court makes no genuine attempt
to engage with the massive legislative record that Congress assembled. Instead it relies on
increases in voter registration and turnout as if that were the whole story.”).
179 See id. at 2647–48 n.9 (arguing that the majority’s focus on the formula “misses the
reality that Congress decided to subject Alabama to preclearance based on evidence of con-
tinuing constitutional violations in that State”).
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The majority’s fixation on the formula is best understood through its response to
the dissent’s argument that Shelby County should not be able to complain about the
coverage formula because regardless of whether the coverage formula properly covers
other places, it should cover Shelby County and Alabama, with their recent history of
race discrimination in voting.180 To the majority, Shelby County is like a driver pulled
over because he is a “redhead” who is then ticketed for failing to have a license.181
The redhead analogy fails. Pulling over a driver because he is a redhead is com-
pletely arbitrary. The dissent responds briefly that Shelby County is “no redhead,”182
but the point deserves elaboration. Imagine that people who have been arrested for
drunk driving have to put a special sticker on their car. Police then pull over people
with the stickers more frequently than cars without the stickers to make sure former
drunk drivers are obeying the law. Surely it is not random to apply greater driving
scrutiny to those with DUIs on their record than to others, even if those DUI convic-
tions are old. Similarly, it is not random to apply greater scrutiny in voting to those
jurisdictions with a history of discrimination than others. It is in this sense that
Shelby County is “no redhead.”183
Shelby County was a recidivist, but the Court majority treated it as though its re-
cent history was irrelevant because its recent history was not captured by Congress’s
coverage formula.184 Rather than reject Shelby County’s facial challenge or use a
severability analysis to separate out unconstitutional applications of preclearance as
counseled by judicial minimalism and urged by the dissent,185 the Court issued a
broad decision applying to all covered jurisdictions, whether they had a clean recent
history or not.186
In the end, the majority fell back on the idea that Section 5’s deterrence argu-
ment goes too far because there would be no way to ever end Section 5 liability
upon proof that it is no longer necessary.187 The Chief Justice made the point color-
fully in the NAMUDNO oral argument, talking about an “elephant whistle” which
keeps away the elephants: one sees no elephants but there is therefore no way to
know if the elephant whistle works or there are simply no elephants.188 As the Chief
Justice wrote in Shelby County, “[u]nder this theory . . . § 5 would be effectively
180 Id. at 2629–30 (majority opinion).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 2647 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183 See id.
184 Id. at 2629–30 (majority opinion).
185 Id. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
186 See id. at 2631 (majority opinion).
187 Id. at 2626–27.
188 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2509 (2006) (No. 08-322)
(“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that’s like the old—you know, it’s the elephant whistle.
You know, I have this whistle to keep away the elephants. You know, well, that’s silly. Well,
there are no elephants, so it must work. I mean, if you have 99.98 percent of these being pre-
cleared, why isn’t that reaching far too broadly.”).
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immune from scrutiny; no matter how ‘clean’ the record of covered jurisdictions,
the argument could always be made that it was deterrence that accounted for the
good behavior.”189
This deterrence argument ignores the role of bailout in limiting the constitu-
tional burden of preclearance. Covered jurisdictions with “clean” records are entitled
to be removed from preclearance,190 and thanks to the Court’s tortured interpretation
of bailout in NAMUDNO, many more political subdivisions were entitled to apply
for bailout from preclearance after 2009. As the dissent observed, “[n]early 200
jurisdictions have successfully bailed out of the preclearance requirement, and DOJ
has consented to every bailout application filed by an eligible jurisdiction since the
current bailout procedure became effective.”191 Had the VRA not been overturned,
over time, as more jurisdictions bailed out, preclearance would become focused on
those jurisdictions with a current record of problems. Bailout, in short, responds to
“current conditions.”192
Had the majority been willing to defer to congressional judgment, it almost cer-
tainly would have upheld the continued preclearance regime. Yet the Court was
dismissive of Congress and the legislative record. How ironic that just a day after
the Court issued Shelby County, four of the Justices in the Shelby County majority
dissented in United States v. Windsor,193 decrying the Court’s failure to defer to
Congress’s judgment about the need for the Defense of Marriage Act.194 As Justice
Scalia wrote (for himself, the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas):
The majority concludes that the only motive for [the Defense of
Marriage Act] was the “bare . . . desire to harm a politically un-
popular group.” . . . Bear in mind that the object of this condem-
nation is not the legislature of some once-Confederate Southern
state (familiar objects of the Court’s scorn . . .), but our respected
coordinate branches, the Congress and Presidency of the United
States. Laying such a charge against them should require the most
extraordinary evidence, and I would have thought that every
attempt would be made to indulge a more anodyne explanation
for the statute.195
189 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627.
190 See id. at 2620 (describing factors that contribute to having a clean record).
191 Id. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192 The court uses the phrase “current conditions” often throughout the majority opinion. See,
e.g., id. at 2627, 2629, 2631 (majority opinion); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
193 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
194 See id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2698–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id.
at 2719–20 (Alito, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 2696 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (“At least without some more convincing evidence that the Act’s principal
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To be sure, Congress could have chosen more pinpointed ways to relieve
covered jurisdictions with improved voting records from the preclearance burden.
During the 2006 reauthorization debates in Congress, I proposed that the bill be
amended to include a “pro-active” bailout provision, which would have required the
DOJ to examine the records of all covered jurisdictions and move to bail out those
jurisdictions with clean records.196 A conservative Republican member of the House
and opponent of Section 5, Lynn Westmoreland, offered my proposed amendment,197
but it went down to resounding defeat as leadership fought all substantive amend-
ments.198 In a story ably told by Nate Persily and Rick Pildes, Congress lacked the
political will to change the coverage formula or otherwise tinker with the Act, and
reauthorization passed on lopsided vote without substantive amendment.199
During the 2006 renewal, few Republicans and no mainstream national Repub-
lican leaders were willing to vote against preclearance.200 Since the 2006 authoriza-
tion, however, mainstream Republicans from covered jurisdictions began publicly
voicing their opposition to the preclearance regime, especially with Democrats now
heading a DOJ in charge of preclearance.201 Fear that attacking preclearance could be
seen as racist gave way to attacks on the DOJ’s preclearance as run by out-of-control
Obama Democrats.202 Rick Perry, Governor of Texas,203 argued against preclearance
purpose was to codify malice, and that it furthered no legitimate government interests, I would
not tar the political branches with the brush of bigotry.”); id. at 2719 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Accordingly, both Congress and the States are entitled to enact laws recognizing either of
the two understandings of marriage.”).
196 Hasen, Pass the VRA Bailout Amendment, supra note 48.
197 Id.; Lynn Westmoreland, Fixing the Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST, June 28, 2009,
at A15.
198 Rick Hasen, Could Congress Moot NAMUDNO by Passing the Proactive Bailout
Amendment Now?, ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2009, 2:45 PM), http://electionlawblog.org
/archives/013542.html [hereinafter Hasen, Could Congress Moot].
199 See generally Persily, supra note 44; Pildes, supra note 49.
200 See Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court,
and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 238 (2012) [hereinafter Hasen, End of the Dialogue?]
(noting the Act was renewed with a vote of ninety-eight-to-zero in the Senate and arguing that
the VRA may have been filibustered if it were to be renewed today).
201 See Josh Gerstein, Voting Rights Act Under Seige, POLITICO (Feb. 19, 2012, 7:06 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73058.html; Richard Hasen, Online VRA Sym-
posium: The Voting Rights Act, Congressional Silence, and the Political Polarization,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-vra
-symposium-the-voting-rights-act-congressional-silence-and-the-political-polarization/
[hereinafter Hasen, Online VRA Symposium].
202 See Gerstein, supra note 201; Hasen, Online VRA Symposium, supra note 201; see also
Hasen, End of the Dialogue?, supra note 200, at 238 & n.115.
203 See Rick Perry, OFF. OF GOVERNOR, http://governor.state.tx.us (last visited Mar. 2, 2014);
see also Hasen, End of the Dialogue?, supra note 200, at 238 & n.115.
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at a Republican presidential debate in 2012 using a military metaphor quite ironic for
the governor of a former confederate state:
I’m saying that the state of Texas is under assault by the federal
government.  I’m saying also that South Carolina is at war with
this federal government and with this administration. When you
look at what this Justice Department has done, not only have
they taken them to task on voter i.d.204
The Shelby County majority surely knows of this sea change in Republican
leaders’ attitudes about the VRA. It also knows of Congress’s increased political
polarization, polarization which has made it exceedingly difficult for Congress to
override Supreme Court statutory decisions, especially on a bipartisan basis.205 Thus,
when the Shelby County majority wrote that it was “only” overturning the coverage
formula and not Section 5 preclearance itself,206 the majority knew full well it was
effectively overturning Section 5 because there will not be the political will to come
up with a new coverage formula.
Further, the Shelby County majority’s “current conditions” and “equal sover-
eignty” standards207 appeared to preclude the possibility that Congress could ever
come up with a coverage formula which could satisfy the majority. It fell to Justice
Thomas, who joined in the majority opinion and wrote separately to argue that pre-
clearance is unconstitutional as well, to demonstrate the logical end of the majority’s
decision: “While the Court claims to ‘issue no holding on § 5 itself,’ . . . its own
opinion compellingly demonstrates that Congress has failed to justify ‘current
burdens’ with a record demonstrating ‘current needs.’ . . . By leaving the inevitable
conclusion unstated, the Court needlessly prolongs the demise of that provision.”208
The statement echoes Justice Scalia’s comment in an earlier campaign finance case,
against a concurring opinion by the Chief Justice, who at that time was unwilling to
overrule precedent allowing a ban on campaign spending from corporate treasuries:
“This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.”209 Just a few years later, in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,210 the Chief Justice reached the
204 Rick Hasen, A Sea Change in Republican Presidential Attitudes on the Voting Rights
Act, ELECTION L. BLOG (Jan. 16, 2012, 8:22 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=28047
[hereinafter Hasen, A Sea Change] (internal quotation marks omitted).
205 See Hasen, End of the Dialogue?, supra note 200, at 209–10, 226–28, 234; Adam Liptak,
In Congress’s Paralysis, A Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, at A10.
206 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
207 Id. at 2621–24, 2629, 2631.
208 Id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
209 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 498–99 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
210 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). As one commentator observed:
Justice Scalia is an outlier on the current court. He is a man in a hurry
who would rather score points than make plans. In 2007, for instance,
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“inevitable” conclusion211 of his reasoning, voting to allow unlimited corporate spend-
ing in elections.212
How in the world under an “equal sovereignty” principle213 will Congress ever
come up with a constitutional standard singling out some jurisdictions for special
scrutiny? Once again, the brief majority opinion offers no answers.
III. THE SHELBY COUNTY DISSENTERS’ MINIMIZED
HISTORY OF THE 2006 RENEWAL
The dissent has the stronger argument regarding the appropriate standard for
reviewing federal voting legislation that Congress passes using its Fifteenth Amend-
ment enforcement powers. It makes the case that, under the Katzenbach rationality
standard,214 there was ample evidence under which Congress rationally could have
concluded that racial discrimination in voting remains a problem in covered jurisdic-
tions and that bailout stood as a useful tool to winnow down the requirement to
those jurisdictions still in need of preclearance because of more recent problems
with racial discrimination in voting.215
Yet there is something unsettling about the dissent and its recounting of the
2006 congressional reauthorization. The dissent tells a happy story from 2006 and
presents the image of a bipartisan, united Congress, confident in the preclearance
provision and unaware of the potential constitutional peril of reenacting the pre-
clearance provision without reworking the coverage formula, easing bailout, lowering
the number of years for renewal, or otherwise taking steps to take into account the
when Chief Justice Roberts took a calculated step toward limiting
campaign finance regulation, Justice Scalia accused him in a concur-
rence of effectively overruling a major precedent “without saying so.”
“This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation,” Justice Scalia said.
Three years later, building on the 2007 decision, the court issued its
decision in Citizens United, allowing unlimited corporate spending in
elections. The chief justice had moved slower than Justice Scalia had
wanted, but he got there.
Adam Liptak, Steady Move to the Right: Roberts Pulls Supreme Court Along to Right Step
by Step, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2013, at A1.
211 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891 (“The interpretive process itself would create an
inevitable, pervasive, and serious risk of chilling protected speech pending the drawing of
fine distinctions that, in the end, would themselves be questionable.”).
212 Id. at 898–99 (rejecting limits on corporate political expenditures).
213 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013).
214 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (allowing “any rational means”
to prohibit voter discrimination).
215 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2014] SHELBY COUNTY AND THE ILLUSION OF MINIMALISM 739
difficult constitutional questions posed by preclearance.216 In the most disingenuous
statement in the dissent, Justice Ginsburg writes that “Congress could hardly have
foreseen that the VRA’s limited geographic reach would render the Act constitu-
tionally suspect.”217 In support of this statement, Justice Ginsburg cited to Persily’s
masterful article on the 2006 renewal,218 which noted that VRA reauthorization
supporters focused their attention on showing why “covered jurisdictions should
remain covered, rather than” why covered jurisdictions were more deserving of cov-
erage than non-covered jurisdictions.219
“[C]ould hardly have foreseen”220 the constitutional problem with the coverage
formula? There was no need for foreseeability. A number of law professors and
political scientists testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on these very
problems.221 Indeed, the NAMUDNO opinion that Justice Ginsburg signed even ref-
erenced Professor Pildes’s testimony on the coverage formula problem and includes
a relevant quote from the Persily article:
Congress heard warnings from supporters of extending § 5 that
the evidence in the record did not address “systematic dif-
ferences between the covered and the non-covered areas of the
United States[,] . . . and, in fact, the evidence that is in the record
suggests that there is more similarity than difference.” The
Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes); see also Persily, The
Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale
L.J. 174, 208 (2007) (“The most one can say in defense of the
[coverage] formula is that it is the best of the politically feasible
alternatives or that changing the formula would . . . disrupt
settled expectations”).222
216 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
217 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649.
218 See id.; Persily, supra note 44.
219 See Persily, supra note 44, at 195.
220 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649.
221 See generally The Continuing Need for Section 5 Preclearance: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10–12 (2006) [hereinafter The Continuing Need for
Section 5 Preclearance] (quoting statement of Richard H. Pildes, NYU); An Introduction to
the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to Reau-
thorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter
An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues
Relating to Reauthorization].
222 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009).
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Pildes’s testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2006 clearly flagged the
constitutional danger,223 as did I.224
223 From the introduction:
First, I am concerned that the evidence in the record does not address
an essential issue to the constitutionality of the proposed bill, and I am
not aware that this concern, though I think it may be essential, has been
addressed in the House hearings or in the previous hearings before this
Committee. The assumption so far of all of the evidence I have seen,
or most of the evidence at least, is that it is sufficient to document con-
tinuing instances of problems in the area of race and voting rights in
the covered jurisdictions. But I am very concerned that under the con-
gruence and proportionality test that the Court now applies in this area,
the Court is going to insist that there be some account of systematic
differences between the covered and non-covered areas of the United
States. There is very little evidence in the record on this, and, in fact,
the evidence that is in the record suggests that there is more similarity
than difference . . . . Now, I want to be clear about why I raise this
point. It is not to assert that the bill as proposed is unconstitutional. But
I look at this record as a lawyer concerned about how the courts will
respond to it, trying to determine how best to ensure the constitution-
ality of a renewed Section 5, and I think this is an essential issue that
has been neglected until now.
The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance, supra note 221.
224 From the introduction:
I come before you as a strong supporter of the Act, who believes
the expiring provisions should be renewed in some form, but also as
someone, who after studying this issue for a number of years, has deep
concerns about the constitutionality of the proposed amendments. I
believe the Act has been an unqualified success in a remarkably in-
creasing minority voter registration and turnout, increasing the number
of African-American and Latino elected officials, and the ability of
minority voters to effectively exercise their right to elect representa-
tives of their choice.
But I urge the Committee to spend the time to craft a bill that will
both pass constitutional muster in the Supreme Court and do the impor-
tant work of continuing to protect minority voting rights in this country.
The constitutional issue, which I have explored in a Law Review
article and have submitted to the Committee, is this: in recent years the
Supreme Court has held that Congress has limited power to enact civil
rights laws regulating the States. Beginning with the 1997 case, City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Court has held that Congress must produce a strong
evidentiary record of intentional State discrimination to justify laws that
burden the States. In addition, whatever burden is placed on the States
must be congruent and proportional to the extent of the violations.
Beginning in 1965, Congress imposed the strong preclearance
remedy on those jurisdictions with what the Supreme Court called a
pervasive, flagrant and unremitting history of discrimination on the basis
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Persily’s article makes crystal clear the dispute on the Senate Judiciary Committee
and deep Republican concerns over constitutionality.225 He additionally points out:
The evolution of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report offers
the best window into the fragility of the political compromise that
undergirds the new VRA and the basic disagreement that exists
concerning its key provision. It also provides a unique case study
in the self-conscious manipulation of legislative history for parti-
san ends and the shadow cast on the legislative bargaining process
by the Supreme Court’s recent federalism precedents.226
It is not only the Persily article, cited by the dissent, which tells this story and
was available to the Shelby County dissenters. The Senate report too, which Persily
describes227 and which Justice Ginsburg cites for other purposes in the dissent,228 was
a strongly political document drafted by Republican party staffers and casted serious
doubts about the continued constitutionality of the preclearance regime.229 The 2006
legislative history demonstrates that the lopsided vote in favor of the bill masked
serious opposition to preclearance by at least some Senate Republicans.230 After the
Court issued Shelby County, former George W. Bush advisor Karl Rove revealed
that President Bush too harbored doubts about the provision’s constitutionality,231
of race. In fact, in [South] Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court upheld
Section 5 of the Act as a permissible exercise of Congressional power.
What has changed since 1965? Both the law and the facts. On the
law, the Court, in my view, wrongly, has placed a higher burden on Con-
gress to justify laws aimed at protecting civil rights. On the facts we
have an evidentiary problem. Because the Act has been so effective, it
will be hard to produce enough evidence of intentional discrimination
by the States so as to justify the extraordinary preclearance remedy for
another 25 years.
An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating
to Reauthorization, supra note 221 (quoting statement of Richard H. Pildes, NYU).
225 Persily, supra note 44, at 189.
226 Id. at 187.
227 Id. at 186–87.
228 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2635 (2013).
229 S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 16 (2006).
230 An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues
Relating to Reauthorization, supra note 221 (statement of Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman
of the Committee) (discussing the constitutional challenges posed by reauthorization).
231 Keli Goff, Rove: Bush Was Skeptical of Voting Rights Act, ROOT (June 27, 2013, 3:02
PM), http://www.theroot.com/blogs/blogging-beltway/rove-bush-was-skeptical-voting-rights-
act (“Bush did sign the renewal of this specific provision because Congress passed it . . . but
we were dubious about it.” (quoting Rove) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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although not a word of such doubt appeared in a presidential signing statement or
in his remarks upon signing the Act.232
Why did the dissenters see the need to sanitize and minimize this modern history?
Perhaps it is just self-denial. Although there is no way to be sure, it is plausible the
dissenters did not want to lend credence to the Shelby County majority’s suggestion
that Congress was insufficiently sensitive to the constitutional issues.233 The problem,
as both Persily and Pildes so well demonstrated,234 was one of political avoidance.
The civil rights community and Republican House Judiciary Committee then-Chair
James Sensenbrenner235 made a calculation that the only way to get the preclearance
provision reenacted in 2006 was to leave the coverage formula and the basic struc-
ture of preclearance untouched.236 Without political pressure from the civil rights
community, which decided to roll the dice, Congress was not going to act.
If the political avoidance reading of the 2006 renewal is correct, then it is less
likely that Congress was satisfied that the coverage formula remained a rational way
to separate those jurisdictions which needed extra federal oversight in their elections
and more likely that Congress accepted the coverage formula because politically its
only choice was the old coverage formula or nothing. One could argue that a Con-
gress making such a choice out of political avoidance was not even acting rationally,
but in a cowardly way.
In the end, the dissenters likely could have written an opinion acknowledging
Congress’s political avoidance yet still sustaining the VRA’s constitutionality. Under
typical rational basis review, Congress’s actual motives are less important than the
plausibility of after-the-fact justifications for Congressional action. There were plenty
of rational justifications to keep the preclearance provision and the old coverage
formula in place, especially with bailout as a winnowing mechanism.237 Especially
without acceptance of the equal sovereignty principle, the dissenters did not need
to demonstrate that the problem in covered jurisdictions is materially different from
232 President Bush apparently did not issue a signing statement in connection with the VRA
renewal. His statement on the signing of the 2006 renewal makes no mention of constitutional
problems and only celebrates the Act’s renewal. See Presidential Statement on Signing the
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1391 (July 27, 2006). In con-
trast, he issued a signing statement raising constitutional concerns about the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002, which he signed. Presidential Statement on Signing the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 517 (Mar. 27, 2002).
233 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618 (noting the VRA’s tenuous constitutional
footing).
234 See supra notes 217–25 and accompanying text.
235 See Corey Dade, Is the Voting Rights Act Outdated?, NPR (Dec. 1, 2012, 10:19 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/12/01/166226641/is-the-voting-rights-act-outdated (interviewing
both James Sensenbrenner and Richard Hasen).
236 See id.
237 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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that in non-covered jurisdictions.238 But a dissenting opinion written along such lines
would lose much of its moral force and the outrage the dissenters wished to express
against the majority opinion. How much better to paint the majority as going against
the will of a unified and bipartisan Congress.239
CONCLUSION
In my 2005 article, one of the first written on Congress’s questionable consti-
tutional power to continue to require the preclearance regime, I posed the “Bull
Connor is Dead” problem240: in an era in which the most blatantly racist officials in
the South and elsewhere have died or left office, and where covered jurisdictions
had modified their behavior in light of Section 5 requirements so that the number of
DOJ objections was asymptotically approaching zero, what kind of evidence would
it take to convince a conservative Supreme Court extremely protective of states’ rights
and skeptical of race-based solutions to anything that Congress remained justified
in requiring preclearance based on a formula using old data?
Congressional leaders who were shepherding the 2006 VRA reauthorization
through Congress were well aware of the constitutional pitfalls when reenacting the
law for another twenty-five years without changing the coverage formula.241 Things
unquestionably have changed for the better in the South, but the question is whether
they changed enough.242 Evidence showed improvements in covered jurisdictions,
238 Id. at 2635–36, 2649–50.
239 The dissenting opinion also contains a major irony. Justice Ginsburg explains that with
“first generation barriers” to the right to vote (such as literacy tests) eliminated, Section 5 now
protects against “second generation barriers,” such as the use of at-large elections rather than
legislative districts to dilute minority voting strengths. Id. at 2634–35. Yet the first of these
second-generation barriers Justice Ginsburg lists is “racial gerrymandering.” Id. (“Second-
generation barriers come in various forms. One of the blockages is racial gerrymandering, the
redrawing of legislative districts in an ‘effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting.’”).
Shaw v. Reno first recognized the racial gerrymander cause of action as an equal protection
claim distinct from a vote dilution claim. 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). The liberal Justices dis-
sented in Shaw, and they and Justice Ginsburg have continued to dissent from this line of cases.
Id. at 658 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); see also, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 103 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Adding to the irony, in these
cases it appears that covered jurisdictions drew lines which constituted “racial gerrymanders”
precisely to comply with the DOJ’s objections under a strong reading of Section 5 of the VRA.
See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be a Liberal to Hate the Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998). Whatever one can say of the merits of
Section 5, it is hard to believe that its continuation would minimize the number of successful
racial gerrymandering claims.
240 Hasen, Congressional Power, supra note 42, at 188–96.
241 See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.
242 Cf. Richard Epstein, The Cynicism of the Voting Rights Act’s Defenders, RICOCHET
(June 26, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/The-Cynicism-of-the-Voting-Rights
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but that race discrimination in voting remained a real problem, at least in some of
the jurisdictions.243 Academics presented Congress with legislative options to in-
crease the chances of the law’s constitutionality before a conservative Supreme
Court by narrowing or updating the Act,244 but congressional leaders and the civil
rights community decided to gamble.245 Even after the strong warning in NAMUDNO
of a looming reversal of preclearance, Congress did nothing. Voting rights supporters
should direct some of their ire at Congress and not just at the Supreme Court.
The fact that this conservative Supreme Court on a five-to-four vote has elimi-
nated the preclearance regime is unsurprising. But the Shelby County opinion reach-
ing that result, with its false humility and its failure to seriously engage a record
which demonstrates continued racial discrimination in voting in covered jurisdic-
tions, is indefensible. The jurisprudential time bombs contained in the opinion are
worse than the false humility, faux adherence to binding precedent, and feigned
expectation that Congress will respond with a new coverage formula as the next step
of the dialogue. From its expansion of the Tenth Amendment to its severe contraction
of the Fifteenth Amendment, the opinion threatens to pull down a host of other voting
laws, including key parts of the VRA in future years.246 None of these features were
necessary even in a Court opinion striking the preclearance provision.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court tried to create an
illusion it was bringing coherence to campaign finance law by eliminating disparities
in treatments of spending limits between domestic corporations and individuals.247
Yet the opinion simply created new disparities, such as between corporations and
individuals on the one hand, who may spend unlimited sums supporting or opposing
candidates for office, and foreign corporations and individuals, who may not.248 In
Shelby County, the same five Justices tried to create a different illusion, that of the
reluctant Court forced by Congress to act and acting in as narrow a way possible. Both
cases are part of Chief Justice Roberts’s longer-term project to bring constitutional
-Act-s-Defenders (“Hasen argues that the Court ‘fantasizes that voting discrimination in the
South is a thing of the past.’ I am old enough to remember the state of race relations in the
United States in 1965. The transformation in race relations since that time is palpable and it
has been decisively and unquestionably for the better. It is irresponsible to suggest that nothing
much has changed in the South on this issue. Hasen’s off-handed slap trivializes the enormity
of Jim Crow by suggesting any resemblance whatsoever between the situation then and the
situation now.”).
243 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (“Problems remain in these States and others, but
there is no denying that, due to the Voting Rights Act, our Nation has made great strides.”).
244 See supra notes 221–29 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 235–36, 241 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 158–61.
247 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898–99 (2010).
248 See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 585 (2011).
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jurisprudence in line with his conservative political vision while seeking to project
the aura of modest technocratic justices simply doing their jobs.249
In the meantime, real politics marches on. Outside spending on elections is
skyrocketing in the wake of Citizens United,250 and previously covered jurisdictions
already are moving to impose new barriers on voting.251 Texas has implemented its
voter identification law,252 one of the toughest in the nation, which accepts a con-
cealed weapons permit, but not a student identification, for voting,253 and which may
require individuals to travel up to 250 miles at their own expense to get a state issued
voter identification card.254 North Carolina, partially covered by Section 5 of the
VRA,255 posted the toughest set of voting rules since the 1965 passage of the VRA.256
These instances alone show the continued deterrent value of Section 5 at the time
the Court killed it.
These changes in politics wrought by the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence are no
coincidence. As the Court applies more free market and color-blind principles to the
political process, from campaign finance to voting rights, expect more of the same.
Sometimes a Court that decides less decides much more.
249 See Ward & Pickerill, supra note 136; see also Hasen, The Chief Justice’s Long Game,
supra note 84 (speaking on the Chief Justice’s “long game”).
250 See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 48 (5th
ed. Supp. 2013).
251 See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. 58
(2014) [hereinafter Hasen, Race or Party?]; Rick Lyman, Texas’ Stringent Voter ID Law
Makes a Dent at Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2013, at A20.
252 See Lyman, supra note 251.
253 Id.
254 See Hasen, The Chief Justice’s Long Game, supra note 84.
255 See Hasen, Race or Party?, supra note 251.
256 Id. In response, the U.S. DOJ has sued Texas and North Carolina. The Department
contends that the new voting laws violate Section 2 of the VRA and the states should be
bailed back into coverage under Section 3 of the Act. See id.
